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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) is a disruptive technology with applications across diverse domains such as transportation and
logistics systems, smart grids, smart homes, connected vehicles, and smart cities. Alongside the growth of these infrastructures, the
volume and variety of attacks on these infrastructures has increased highlighting the significance of distinct protection mechanisms.
Intrusion detection is one of the distinguished protection mechanisms with notable recent efforts made to establish effective intrusion
detection for IoT and IoV. However, unique characteristics of such infrastructures including battery power, bandwidth and processors
overheads, and the network dynamics can influence the operation of an intrusion detection system. This paper presents a
comprehensive study of existing intrusion detection systems for IoT systems including emerging systems such as Internet of Vehicles
(IoV). The paper analyzes existing systems in three aspects: computational overhead, energy consumption and privacy implications.
Based on a rigorous analysis of the existing intrusion detection approaches, the paper also identifies open challenges for an effective
and collaborative design of intrusion detection system for resource-constrained IoT system in general and its applications such as IoV.
These efforts are envisaged to highlight state of the art with respect to intrusion detection for IoT and open challenges requiring
specific efforts to achieve efficient intrusion detection within these systems.
Index Terms—Intrusion Detection, Internet of Things, Ubiquitous Computing, Privacy, Computation and Energy overheads
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The use of sensor devices has witnessed an extraordinary
increase over the last few years leading to their prolifera-
tion across diverse domains such as wearables, intelligent
appliances, and vehicles. The ability of these devices to
be connected to a network has introduced exciting new
paradigms such as the Internet of Things (IoT). IoT has
received significant attention as a disruptive technology and
is fundamental to the networks of the future. A recent study
by Frost and Sullivan has predicted the number of IoT
devices to increase to 45.41 billion devices in 2023 [1]. This
has caused direct impact on industrial applications such as
automotive industry, commercial security cameras, as well
as consumer applications such as wearables, smart TVs, and
smart meters.
A typical IoT system consists of devices with resource
constraints such as limited processing power, energy re-
sources and communication range etc. These constraints
mandate communication technologies that require limited
energy overheads, provide efficient performance under di-
verse conditions and support larger address space. A num-
ber of advanced wireless communication technologies have
emerged to facilitate these requirements. These include
RFID [2], Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) [3], Zig Bee [4],
Bluetooth and IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area
Networks (6LoWPAN)[5] and have shaped M2M communi-
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cation as well as dedicated communication technologies for
emerging paradigms such as IoT and IoV.
However, the open network architecture of IoT has also
attracted intruders to use this network of thousands of
devices for spreading malicious content such as the re-
cent IoT botnets [6]–[8]. Furthermore, a recent study by
Gartner [9] has predicted IoT based attacks to form 25%
of all enterprise attacks by 2020 highlighting the need for
distinct protection mechanisms. Due to the proliferation of
such devices in almost every aspect of our life, the threats
posed due to their insufficient security are unique with
insecure devices exposing the end users to serious security
and privacy threats. For instance, if an attacker is able to
compromise an in-car WiFi; in-car devices and data will be
at risk. Once inside the network, an attacker can spoof the
car, connect to outside data sources, and steal the owners
personal information including credit card data [10].
In view of such emerging threats, the need to address
security challenges for an IoT system is paramount. There
have been a number of efforts to address different dimen-
sions of security for IoT such as secure frameworks [11],
[12], privacy of information [13], and authentication [14].
However, the challenge in the design of an effective secure
system is two-fold: firstly, the devices which form these
systems are typically resource constrained which limits their
ability to host sophisticated security management system
that can monitor the device in real time, secondly the ad-hoc
nature of IoT and IoV systems allows devices to connect to
other devices at runtime, typically for short time periods,
thereby creating a collaborative network.
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are normally placed at the
edge of the network to strengthen security capabilities of a
system in the event of a malicious attempts. Over the last
few years, intrusion detection systems for the IoT system
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2have received increased attention with a number of intru-
sion detection systems proposed such as [15]–[17]. Within
this context, the focus of our research is to investigate novel
challenges to achieve efficient intrusion detection for IoT
systems and explore dedicated solutions to address them.
In view of this, we present an in-depth study of the state-of-
the-art with respect to intrusion detection within IoT iden-
tifying limitations of current approaches and highlighting
future directions.
Through our research, we have identified existing efforts
to study the state-of-the-art for intrusion detection for IoT
systems with [18] and [19] being the most notable efforts. Al-
though these efforts present a structured analysis of existing
literature within IoT intrusion detection domain, these share
a significant limitation in being agnostic of the performance
overhead and privacy implications. For instance, using the
interaction ability proposed by [18], Jun and Chi [20] scores
high (three) indicating its efficiency to protect a IoT system.
However, a deeper analysis of the system highlights that it
is remarkably CPU intensive which will affect its suitability
for IoT system. In view of these limitations, we undertake
rigorous analysis of the intrusion detection systems taking
into account a number of performance related attributes to
present an exhaustive evaluation of existing approaches for
intrusion detection in IoT systems.
Considering the limitations of the existing studies, this
paper makes following contributions:
• A comprehensive attack model for IoT systems
which is envisaged to inform state of the art for
intrusion detection within IoT. The attack model
comprises of threats across different dimensions of
an IoT system aiming to aid improved classification.
• An extensive review of efforts with respect to intru-
sion detection for IoT systems. An in-depth review
has been conducted taking into account critical at-
tributes such as performance overhead and privacy
implications.
• Identification of open challenges to achieve effective
intrusion detection for IoT systems. This is informed
by extension review and analysis of existing intru-
sion detection research within IoT systems.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 in-
troduces a comprehensive attack model for IoT systems.
Section 3 includes a detailed discussion about the existing
reviews of intrusion detection research within IoT high-
lighting unanswered questions. Extensive review of existing
literature within intrusion detection for IoT is presented in
Section 4 which is organized into different types of IDS and
therefore provides a linkage with classification introduced
in Section 3. Section 5 presents privacy implications of
intrusion detection systems followed by 6 which provides a
thorough analysis of the existing literature with respect to a
number of attributes including intrusion detection and per-
formance efficiency. Through the findings of our research,
section 7 discusses open challenges which require further
attention followed by conclusions and future aims of our
research in section 8.
2 AN ATTACK MODEL FOR IOT SYSTEMS
Although IoT is an emerging paradigm, a significant part of
the software stack used by the IoT applications is adopted
from existing software paradigms. This is also evident from
the concept of integrating IoT specific stack (such as specific
to Zigbee, 6LoWPAN and RPL) with the existing Internet
infrastructure such as IPv5 and IPv6. This has significant
implications with respect to the threat model for IoT in-
frastructures as it is not restricted to the threats specific
to the new routing protocols such as 6LoWPAN and RPL
but also includes threats to existing infrastructure such as
IPv6, application specific attacks and attacks specific to the
physical media such as the radio spectrum. In this section
we present a taxonomy of attack types for a typical IoT
system.
2.1 Routing-specific threats
Routing information in IoT system can be modified or
spoofed in order to divert the traffic or create an attack on
the IoT network. These attacks are most common attacks in
the resource-constrained IoT and sensor networks. The most
relevant routing attacks in IoT includes the following:
Rank attack: A defining characteristic of 6LoWPAN
networks is the use of ranking to establish optimal routing
path. Within this context, Node Rank indicates the quality of
the path from a node to the sink node. Every time a node
updates its rank or preferred parent, it needs to inform other
nodes by sending the updated information in the next DIO.
RPL uses the Rank rule that a node in the parent should always
have lower rank than its children to prevent the loop creation. This
way, the rank enables creating optimal topology, preventing
loop creation and managing control overhead [21]. As iden-
tified by [21]–[23] the rank information can be maliciously
tampered with by an attacker so that it chooses the node
with worst Rank to be its parent. This will therefore result
in disturbing the topology of the network causing delays in
normal transmission.
Wormhole attack: A wormhole can be considered as a
tunnel between two nodes using wired or wireless links
and can be used to achieve faster transmission rates or ded-
icated connection between such nodes. As such, wormhole
has legitimate applications such as the connection between
the local and global IDS modules within our architecture.
Wormhole can be used by an attacker to create a dedicated
tunnel with a node on the Internet as identified by [24].
Wormhole attack is not novel to the IoT systems and has
been historically identified as a potential threat for wireless
sensor networks by [25]–[27].
Sinkhole attack: The objective of a sinkhole attack is
to attract traffic through a designated node using illegiti-
mate information making the node a lucrative routing sink
(base station within wireless network terminology). As with
wormhole attack, literature around sinkhole attack is well
established with [28] being an initial effort to identify and
mitigate against such attack. Creating a sinkhole does not
necessarily disrupt legitimate transmission within a 6LoW-
PAN however by diverting the traffic through a specific
route creates opportunities to launch other attacks such as
wormhole and selective forwarding attack described below.
3Fig. 1: A Taxonomy of attacks for IoT systems
Selective forwarding attack: With selective forwarding
attack, a malicious node attempts to disrupt legitimate
transmission and routing path. The malicious node in this
case attempts to block certain packets and forward selected
packets thereby affecting the routing. For instance, an at-
tacker can forward all RPL control messages but block the
rest [24]. This attack can cause more damage when used in
conjunction with sinkhole attack. Such dependencies among
different attack types has motivated us to explore the impact
of multi-stage attacks within IoT infrastructures. To the best
of our knowledge the intrusion detection system presented
in this paper is the pioneer effort to identify this issue and
explore solution to mitigate against it.
Fragment duplication attack: The fragment duplication
attack leverages a weakness within the 6LoWPAN layer
with respect to how fragmented packets are received and
assembled by an IoT node. A consequence of the integration
of 6LoWPAN with IPv6 networks is that larger packets sup-
ported by IPv6 have to be fragmented into smaller packets
so as to be effectively processed by the resource-constrained
nodes within an IoT system. However, as identified by [29],
a recipient node cannot verify if two fragments of a packet
were sent by the same source therefore the recipient node
is unable to distinguish between legitimate and spoofed
fragments. A malicious node can exploit this vulnerability
to block reassembly of targeted packets such as connection
establishment packets. This may result in disrupting legiti-
mate traffic as well as depleting resources available to the
victim node.
Buffer reservation attack: The buffer reservation attack
is closely linked to the fragment duplication attack and
may be caused as a consequence of a successful fragment
duplication attack. The buffer reservation attack also targets
the vulnerability in the fragmentation mechanism employed
by 6LoWPAN networks. As identified by [29], it leverages
the fact that the recipient of a fragmented packet is unable
to determine if all fragments will be received correctly.
Therefore, a recipient node reserves a buffer space based on
the information provided in the 6LoWPAN header with any
additional fragments discarded. Taking advantage of this
setting, a malicious node can send its victim single FRAG1
to reserve arbitrary buffer space thereby consuming scarce
memory of the resource-constrained node.
Sybil and clone ID attack: Sybil and Clone ID attacks
are similar in that the objective of the attacker is to use
spoofed logical identities within a network without deploy-
ing physical devices. In particular, for Clone ID attack, an
attacker is aiming to use a victims logical identity within
the network whereas in Sybil attack, the attacker aims to
assume multiple logical identities within a network without
deploying physical nodes. These logical identities may not
be currently present in the network. A number of existing
efforts such as [24], [28] have identified these attacks for IoT
and historically for wireless sensor networks.
2.2 Application specific threats
In addition to the routing specific threats mentioned above,
IoT infrastructures are susceptible to other types of threats
such as application specific threats. Although routing forms
an essential component of the IoT system, the IoT devices
are expected to run application software required by the
function envisaged to be performed. We categorize these
threats as application specific and present them below.
Denial of Service attack: Historically, Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks are targeted at making the victim unavailable
for legitimate service. This can be achieved via flooding
the victim with extraordinarily large volume of requests
or by exhausting the resources such as memory and com-
putational power available to the victim. Within IoT, the
threat of DoS attack is two-folds: the victim can be part
of the network under threat that an attacker wishes to
make unavailable or the victim can be used as a zombie
(stepping stone) to launch a Distributed DoS (DDoS) on a
target IoT network. The significance of these threats within
IoT systems have been identified by [30]–[32].
Malicious code injection: As identified by [31], [33], ma-
licious code injection is another application specific threat
to IoT systems. The attacker, in this case, attempts to inject
malicious code to get privileged access to the victim. Con-
sequently, the attacker can damage the normal operation by
causing threat to the data or to the network using one of the
routing specific attacks described in the previous section.
42.3 Traditional attacks
In addition to the above mentioned attacks, IoT systems
are vulnerable to the existing attacks targeted at computer
systems such as message interception, fabrication, modifi-
cation, subversion and phishing etc. As with the routing-
specific attacks, these attacks can also form a part of a more
complicated/sophisticated attack.
3 EXISTING IDS SURVEYS FOR IOT
An IDS is a hardware or software system which can be
deployed at a system level or at the edge networks. It
mainly serves to analyze the Internet packets and events
(inbound and outbound) to identify malicious activities,
and take actions according to the security policies of the
network. IDS can be categorized into the following main
approaches: misuse/signature based detection systems, be-
havioural or anomaly based detection, specification based
intrusion detection and hybrid intrusion detection systems
[34]–[36]. The history of intrusion detection within IoT
networks has its foundations within the Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN) where the focus has been on identifying
and mitigating against threats misusing routing protocols.
The routing protocols within such networks were optimized
to work within a resource constrained environment and
therefore prioritizing performance over security [37]. With
the introduction of LoWPAN and RPL networks, sensor
networks are now connected to the contemporary IP net-
work resulting in expansion of the attack surface of such
networks. Therefore, such networks are not only vulnerable
to malicious attempts targeting routing protocols but also
to the contemporary Internet-based attacks such as code
injection, DoS and phishing - we present a bespoke attack
model for IoT networks in the next section. We believe, the
cutting edge efforts in IDS for IoT networks should take
these considerations into account to mitigate against such
malicious attempts.
The concept of IoT has evolved over the last two decades
and therefore shares similarities with concepts such as
Mobile Adhoc Networks (MANETs) and Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSN). Consequently, a number of studies have
been performed to review state of the art within intrusion
detection for these paradigms. For instance, [38]–[40], pre-
sented state of the art with respect to IDS for the MANETs,
whereas [41], [42] have reviewed existing IDSs for WSNs.
In this paper, we focus solely on the intrusion detection
approaches for the IoT system in general and therefore
applicable for its applications such as IoV.
With respect to the review of the state of the art for the
intrusion detection for the IoT [18] and [19] represent the
notable efforts. Gendreau et al. [18] define a term called
Interaction Ability of an IDS to assess the level of holistic de-
tection intelligence. This parameter is defined as the ability
of an IDS to interact with different service layers within the
system i.e. Network Interface, Internet, Transport and Ap-
plication layers. Therefore, the interaction ability of an IDS
can have a maximum value of four. Authors have attempted
to review seven recent intrusion detection systems against
the interaction ability metric to identify respective efficiency.
Although interaction ability is a useful indicator however
we believe the intrusion detection landscape within IoT
requires a rigorous analysis of existing efforts. For instance,
one of the unique features of IoT systems is their limit to
the resources available. Focusing on interaction ability alone
ignores this significant characteristic and therefore although
Jun and Chi [20] scores high (three) for interaction ability,
indicating its efficiency to protect a IoT system. However, a
deeper analysis of the system highlights that it is remarkably
CPU intensive which will affect its suitability for IoT system.
Therefore, we undertake rigorous analysis of the intrusion
detection systems taking into account number of different
parameters as explained in Section 4.
Furthermore, [19] present a recent survey of IDS research
efforts for IoT with objective to identify leading trends,
open issues, and future research possibilities. The authors
classified the IDSs proposed in the literature according to
the following attributes: detection method, IDS placement
strategy, security threat and validation strategy. The authors
also present a summary of security threats for a typical
IoT system. Although the authors present a comprehensive
system to analyze existing intrusion detection efforts, how-
ever, similar to [18], this effort is agnostic of the impact
of the intrusion detection operation with respect to its
performance. This is significant in the case of IoT systems
due to the limited resources for these devices such as CPU,
memory, storage, bandwidth and battery. In view of this, we
conduct a review which takes into account these attributes
to present an exhaustive evaluation of existing approaches
for intrusion detection in IoT systems.
In addition to the above, Zitta et al, present an effort for
intrusion detection system for RFIDs in [43] using raspberry
Pi. As part of their study, the authors have conducted a
comparative analysis of the existing intrusion detection and
prevention systems (IDPS) using attributes such as location
of the system, scalability and IPS function. This comparison
is limited as i) it does not present an exhaustive selection of
intrusion detection approaches for IoT devices, and ii) the
comparison performed does not take into account the per-
formance overhead of the intrusion detection approaches.
Furthermore, intrusion detection within WSN is a well-
established research domain which can be adopted within
the IoT. However, most of these approaches are built on
the assumptions that (i) there is no central management
point and controller, (ii) there exists no message security,
and (iii) nodes cannot be identified globally. The IoT has a
novel architecture where the 6BR is assumed to be always
accessible, end-to-end message security is a requirement
[44], and sensor nodes are globally identified by an IP
address. Besides these opportunistic features, an IDS for
the IoT is still challenging since the things (i) are globally
accessible, (ii) are resource constrained, (iii) are connected
through lossy links, and (iv) use recent IoT protocols such as
CoAP [10], Zigbee, RPL [45], or 6LoWPAN [5]. This analysis
indicates the rationale for investigating and addressing the
challenges for effective intrusion detection IoT.
4 REVIEW OF EXISTING IDS APPROACHES FOR
IOT
Through our research, we have identified that intrusion
detection research for IoT systems can be categorized into:
Anomaly, Signature, Specification, Hybrid, and Game based
5models. Therefore, we present review of existing efforts
using these categorization.
4.1 Anomaly based approaches to intrusion detection
Nobakht et al. [46] propose a host based IDS using Software
Defined Technology (SDN) for smart homes. The authors
have defined three basic requirements for an efficient IDS
for IoT i.e. unobtrusive approach, negligible overheads, and
scalability. In view of these requirements, the proposed
approach uses sensors to host the intrusion detection mod-
ule which is envisioned to monitor network traffic visible
at the sensor device. The detection can be performed us-
ing a choice of detection modules i.e. signature, anomaly
or specification based techniques. The authors claim that
hosting the intrusion detection module within a sensor
device alleviates the communication overhead. However,
this choice increases the processing overhead at the sensor
device simultaneously which is critical for such low pow-
ered devices.
In [47], Chordia and Gupta proposed an anomaly based
IDS aiming to reduce false alarm rates and increase the
detection efficiency using data mining techniques. The pro-
posed system aims to monitor network traffic and uses
techniques such as K-NN ,K-Means and Decision Table Ma-
jority Rule Based scheme. The authors have focused on four
attacks namely U2R ,R2R ,DoS and Probe. In the first phase,
k-means clustering is used as pre-classification. In the next
stage significant clusters are classified into attack classes
by using K-NN. As a final step, Decision Table majority
rule is used to categorize network events as malicious or
non-malicious. The authors have used KDD99 dataset to
evaluate the effectiveness of the approach which highlights
the unavailability of data from an IoT system to aid more
rigorous and proportionate evaluation.
Khan and Herrmann [48] presented an effort where
an IDS is designed and evaluated for IoT by using trust
management mechanism that collects information about
neighboring devices and their reputation. The authors in-
vestigate the patterns of normal use for the RPL protocol
and use these patterns as a foundation to devise trust
among the sensor nodes and the edge routers. Therefore,
the proposed approach can be categorized as an anomaly
based intrusion detection and is aimed at routing-specific
attacks such as sinkhole, selective forwarding and version
number. The trust management algorithms devised as part
of this approach aim to develop trust and reputation values
which are used by a border router to assess if a node is
malicious or non-malicious.
An anomaly based distributed IDS for IoT is proposed
in [49] whereby each node monitors the working of nearby
nodes for any abnormal activity. If some abnormality is de-
tected then its packets are blocked and problem is reported
to the parent node or root node by Distress Propagation
Object (DPO). In the proposed system all information is
managed locally within the nodes and parent nodes are noti-
fied if an anomaly occurs. It follows a Cross Layer approach
so that unwanted packets are not processed at LowPAN
Lower. The system has three subsystems i.e. Monitoring and
Grading Subsystem (MGSS), Reporting Subsystem (RSS)
and Isolated Subsystem (ISS). The MGSS serves as the
primary component responsible for information collection,
analysis and grading of a monitored threat whereas the RSS
component is responsible for status update using DPO. The
threats monitored by the MGSS are also reported to the edge
router which can serve as a central alert gathering system
with options to deploy correlation to further investigate or
verify a threat.
Zhang et al. [50] proposed a hierarchical and distributed
IDS (SGDIDS) for smart grids which is applied to three
layer communication network i.e. Home Area Network
(HAN), Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN) and Wide
Area Network (WAN). The WSN used in smart grids are
prone to a variety of attacks like DoS or Man in the Middle
(MIM). Power measurements can also be altered by different
attacks. So Smart Grid without any IDS cannot produce
expected operation. As the attack surface for a typical
smart grid comprises of threats targeting the physical power
system as well as the IT infrastructure supporting it, the
SGDIDS is envisioned to address the cyber-physical nature
of smart grids protecting against both these types of attacks.
The intrusion detection architecture proposed as part of this
effort has an IDS module developed at each of the three
layers which monitor communications at each layer. The
proposed system leverages classification algorithms such as
support vector machine (SVM) and artificial immune system
(AIS) in order to determine if an attack is occurring, what
type of attack it is, and where it comes from in the commu-
nication system. The SGDIDS shares some similarities with
a typical IoT network in that an IoT network can be divided
into two levels i.e. IoT devices and the edge routers with the
possibility to adopt SGDIDS approach for a hierarchical IDS.
Furthermore, the attack surface for smart grids overlaps
signifcantly with that for a typical IoT network therefore
the results of this research are relevant within a generic IDS
for IoT.
[16] presented a network anomaly based model for in-
trusion detection called Two Layer Dimension Reduction
and Two Tier Classification TDTC model used in IoT back-
bone networks. The authors have focused on two specific
attacks types i.e. User to Root (U2R) and Root to Local
(R2L). The proposed system has advantages of multilayer
classifier so has high detection rate with high performance,
low false positive rates due to introduction of a refinement
feature and decreased computational complications. The
proposed model consists of a dimension reduction and
a classification module. Dimension Reduction module is
proposed to address the problems due to dimensionality
which can increase the complexity of decision making and
also leading to incorrect decisions. The authors have used
both supervised and unsupervised reduction techniques to
solve this issue. In particular, Linear Discriminant Analysis
LDA(supervised) and Principal Component Analysis PCA
(unsupervised) are used where PCA is used for feature
selection and extraction, and LDA provides fast and efficient
IDS. In the proposed system Naive Bayes Classifier is used
for anomaly detection which is normalized using certainty
factor version of KNN. The authors have performed experi-
mentation to evaluate the performance of TDTC identifying
that it uses only two features of new mapped data instead
of 4 and it is more efficient in detecting U2R, R2L, Probe
and DoS attacks. TDTC is also reported to have reduced the
6Fig. 2: Categorization of IDS for IoT systems
false alarm rate from 6-3 % to 5.56%.
In [51], Summerville et al. presented a deep packet
anomaly detection system involving feature selection con-
ducted by pattern matching. It can be applied to either
stateless or stateful configuration using sliding window op-
eration which reduces the complexity. Two Internet enabled
devices are considered which are: a weather station and an
interactive networked video camera. They serve as sensor
and actuator respectively. By experiments it was identified
that IoT sensor detected 99.9% of abnormal packets. IoT
actuator detected a bit less as 92.9%. Results showed that
64 by 32 detector has lower detection than higher size
detectors. Also if we move from 2 dimensional feature to 3
dimensional feature then the accuracy improved from 47.7%
to 100% per window and from 98.4% to 100% per packet.
The proposed system can be implemented in hardware or
software. It can be deployed into device interface or can be
built into network appliances or firewalls. It results in low
occurrence of false positives. Device specific traffic can be
differentiated from other traffic through proper system.
A user centric approach is proposed in [52] for security
consisting of two main blocks i.e. a habit based approach
for anomaly detection system and semantic based firewall
for access control and security during communication. An
algorithm is developed users habit modelling so that any
change in the behaviour can be detected. The authors con-
sider use of IoT devices within a private setting such as
home networks with devices such as a wrist bracelet acting
as a data storage device for an individual, a connected
light bulb which indicates the on/off situation and a smart
TV giving track of the programs/channels being watched.
Within this context, the authors focus on the personal data
collected and communicated by the devices. The authors
use anomaly based approach for intrusion detection due to
the unavailability of a signature database for attacks on IoT
systems. The authors do not discuss details of the detection
accuracy, performance efficiency, visibility for the intrusion
detection and its placement.
Yang et al. [53] focuses on Node issue of IoT is addressed
which can result in false data injection (FDI) attack which
affects data aggregation. For this purpose Bayesian Spa-
tial Temporal (HBST) model is described and an anomaly
detection method is proposed to detect the compromised
node at an early stage. In the proposed system divided
7difference filtering (DDF) based state estimation technique
is used to detect false aggregated data. The system achieves
high detection rate and low false positives rates with low
detection samples. The proposed scheme works in static
cluster base network nodes and follows an assumption that
adversary is competent to compromise a subset of set of
networks. It is capable of detecting compromised aggregator
as long as the adversary launch the FDI attack with a
probability of more than 58.7%. Here a game theoretic model
is presented overcome the problem of detection of false data
injection. Simulation is done for effectiveness and efficiency
using TOSSIM to measure the computation and storage
overhead. According to the data model, a threshold decision
mechanism is designed for data integrity. Performance of
the proposed scheme is robust against interruption of attack
behaviour and harsh environment.
4.2 Signature based approaches to intrusion detection
Kasinathan et al. [54] presented an IDS framework for
6LoWPAN which was able to detect denial of service at-
tacks by monitoring physical parameters of the device. The
proposed IDS is included into an IoT network and monitors
network traffic for both signatures and abnormal behaviour
to identify malicious users. The intrusion detection com-
ponent of the proposed system is implemented using an
open source IDS Suricata which has complete IPv6 support,
multithreading, automatic protocol detection and a built-in
intrusion prevention system. The proposed system results in
detecting flooding attacks with an increased detection rate
where larger number of Mp nodes are in the same attack.
Furthermore, Kasinathan et al. claim that the proposed IDS
overcomes resource constraint problem which is one of the
critical requirements for the sensor devices.
Forzin et al. [55] proposed leveraging the Snort, con-
temporary signature based network level IDS, to establish
a portable, easy to use and versatile intrusion detection
for IoT networks. The resultant IDS is packages within a
Raspberry Pi so it can be transported with the device to any
network the hardware travels to. By doing this, the device is
not dependent on a centralized IDS which is a clear benefit
of a host based intrusion detection system. In addition to
this, the authors propose using these packaged RPi to work
in collaboration to achieve detection of sophisticated attacks
such as those targeting network topology. Under this setup,
an IDS node can request data captured by neighboring
nodes to perform rigorous analysis and reduce false posi-
tives. In view of the increasing threats for IoT systems with
respect to volume and sophistication, this observation will
be crucial to an effective intrusion detection for IoT systems.
Indre and Lemnaru [56] proposed a modular architec-
ture for intrusion detection is proposed which uses net-
work traffic captured as part of the Data Capture Module.
The captured network traffic is consumed by three mod-
ules employing different detection techniques i.e. signature,
anomaly and specification based systems. The aim is to
filter faulty packets by comparing packet with malicious
header segment using static rules using signature based de-
tection, anomaly based detection aims to identify abnormal
data patterns and specification based detection focuses on
botnet detection. The proposed approach is an example of
approaches which use multiple type of detection techniques
to achieve intrusion detection for IoT systems. However,
the proposed approach envisages intrusion detection at the
edge router level which compromises visibility of the sys-
tem. Furthermore, although the proposed approach makes
use of three different detection techniques however the
mechanism to aggregate the outcome of these techniques
is unclear.
4.3 Game based approaches to intrusion detection
Wang et al. [57] proposed an attack-defence game model
is proposed to detect malicious nodes using repeated game
approach. The authors claim to have developed a tree model
which is used to formulate an optimal solution to the error
detection problems. The authors focus on the detection
strategy and the performance overhead caused by such a
module on the individual sensor devices. This is achieved
by developing a repeated game method where attackers
and defenders can alter strategies to achieve maximum pay
offs. The authors aim to achieve high detection accuracy
without incurring significant performance overhead with
experimental results supporting these claims. The authors
do not discuss challenges such as placement of the IDS mod-
ule, type of the detection engine and the level of visibility to
it which can contribute towards the overall effectiveness of
an IDS for M2M or IoT networks.
La et al. [58] propose a honeypot based approach to
improve defence against malicious attempts within an IoT
infrastructure. In order to strengthen the defence, authors
propose to use a game theoretic model with the defender
using honeypot to deceive the attacker. The proposed sys-
tem focuses on scenarios where the attacker is not known
to the defender which consequently means that the system
does not take into account attempts such as Rank Attack
which can be initiated by an insider node known to the
system. The proposed system is designed and implemented
in isolation to the specific challenges and requirements of
the IoT infrastructures such as the resource constraints, in-
teractions between different IoT devices, and the positioning
of the system etc. The authors present the experimentation
performed in Matlab which models the overall concept of
the system however a Matlab based implementation can
serve as a simulation of the proposed model agnostic of
the IoT system. We believe this to be a limitation, as an
effective intrusion detection mechanism for IoT systems
should ideally take into account the unique characteristics
of such systems as those explained above.
8TABLE 1: Comparative analysis of existing IDS approaches for IoT
Paper Visibility Time Detection
Engine
Architecture Performance Over-
head
Attack Types Detection
Performance
Scalability
Midi et
al. [15]
Network Offline Hybrid Collaborative CPU usage:0.19%,
RAM usage
(KB)=13978.62%
ICMP Flooding,
SMURF
Detection Rate:
91%, Accuracy:
100%
Yes
Fu et al.
[59]
Network Realtime Specification
based
Distributed Latency: 4.12us,
power consump-
tion: 7.5w
Buffer overflow,
probing, finger
printing
N/A Yes
Kasi.et
al. [54]
Network Offline Signature
based
Distributed N/A DoS Accuracy:100% Limited
Forzin
et al.
[55]
Network Combined Signature
based
Distributed CPU usage: 100%
for 70Mb/s, RAM
usage: 475MB
IP Spoofing N/A Limited
Nobakth
et al.
[46]
Host Realtime Hybrid Distributed N/A Masquareding Accuracy: 94.25%,
Recall: 85.05%
Limited
Chordia
et al.
[47]
Network Offline Anomaly
based
Centralised CPU usage: 49% U2R, R2L, DoS, Probe Accuracy: 95.55%,
Detection rate:
93.67%, FPR: 0.019
No
Jun et
al.[60]
Network Realtime Specification
based
Centralised CPU usage: 48%,
RAM usage:
684MB, processing
time: 368ms
Generic N/A No
Khan et
al. [48]
Network Offline Anomaly
based
Distributed N/A routing-specific
attacks: sinkhole,
selective forwarding
and version number
For 300 nodes:
FNR=26%,
FPR=47%,
Detection Rate=
50%
Yes
Indre et
al. [56]
Network Offline Hybrid Centralised N/A Probing and DoS Detection
Accuracy=98.4%
No
Thani.
et al.
[49]
Network Offline Anomaly
based
Distributed N/A Neighbouring node
discrepancy
N/A Yes
Amaral
et al.
[61]
Network Offline Specification
based
Distributed N/A Signature mismatch-
ing
N/A Yes
Zhang
et al.
[50]
Network Offline Anomaly
based
Distributed N/A DoS, U2R, R2L FPR: 0.67, 0.7 and
1.3. FNR: 2.15,
21.02, 26.32%
Yes
Haddad
et
al.[16]
Network Offline Anomaly
based
Centralised N/A U2R and R2L Detection accuracy:
81.97% and FPR:
5.44%
No
Summ.
et al.
[51]
Network Offline Anomaly
based
Distributed N/A Worm propagation,
tunneling, SQL code
injection
Detection accuracy:
100%
Yes
Tamani
et al.
[52]
Network Offline Anomaly
based
Distributed N/A Privacy Threats N/A Yes
Wang
et al.
[57]
Network Offline Game
theory
Distributed Energy consump-
tion: avg 2.0J for
300 nodes, Energy
consumption: avg
2.0J for 300 nodes
N/A Detection accuracy:
avg. 80%
Yes
Yang et
al. [53]
Network Offline Anomaly
based
N/A Energy consump-
tion: 8,48mJ
N/A N/A
Sedje.
et al.
[62]
Network Offline Hybrid Distributed Efficiency: 2s, en-
ergy consumption:
approx 3000 mj for
300 nodes
DoS Detection accuracy
92% for large num-
ber of nodes. FPR:
3%
Yes
Raza et
al. [17]
Network Realtime Hybrid Distributed efficiecny:
¿150000mj for
64 nodes
sinkhole and selec-
tive forwarding at-
tacks
TPR: approx 80%
for 30 nodes on avg.
Yes
Le et al.
[63]
Network Realtime Specification
based
Hybrid energy consump-
tion: 202J, power
consumption: 6.3%
increase (1.2mW)
Rank, sinkhole and
neighbour attacks
TPR: 100%, FPR:
apprix: 3% avg
Yes
Mayza.
et al.
[64]
Network Offline Other Distributed N/A version number at-
tacks
FPR: 0% for some
simulations
Yes
Arshad
et al.
[65]
Both Offline Hybrid Collaborative energy consump-
tion: avg 8.5mW for
1, 10, 100 and 1000
packets/sec
Generic N/A Yes
94.4 Specification based approaches to intrusion detec-
tion
Fu et al. [59] propose an IDS for Internet of Vehicles (IoV) i.e.
an open and integrated network system connecting human
intelligence, vehicles, things, environments and the internet.
Authors explain fundamental requirements for an IDS for
IoV i.e host protection via detection, constrained resources,
and real-time detection. Through our research we identify
these to be shared by a typical IoT system. Due to these
requirements, conventional IDS is not feasible as it incurs
significant overhead with respect to required resources and
processing time. In order to fulfil these requirements, an
FPGA based IDS is proposed which can work in real time
and applicable to IoV security however it limits versatility of
the approach as it is unclear if the system can be translated
for other hardware. An extended NFA called Link NFA is
proposed to eliminate the transition problem of Multistride
NFA. The rulesets are adopted from the existing IDS like
Snort, Bro and L7 Filter. In [60] a Complex Event Processing
(CEP) based approach to intrusion detection for IoT is
proposed with the aim to provide low latency and real time
processing of security events. Although the use of CEP for
intrusion detection is not novel, it is a rather innovative
concept within intrusion detection for IoT and this work
can be considered as a means to assess the feasibility of
CEP within IoT. The proposed system is developed as a rule
based IDS which collects network traffic data from the edge
router, extracts events from this data and performs intrusion
detection. Although the discussion of the approach is not
detailed, we believe CEP can be explored further to address
sophisticated or coordinated attacks within IoT which are a
combination of simple attack steps.
Amaral et al. [61] present a network based intrusion
detection system for internet-connected WSN which share
close similarities with a typical IoT network. The authors
adopt a distributed approach to their design in that the
IDS system is deployed as a module on randomly selected
devices called watchdogs (sensor nodes as well as edge
routers) over a WSN. Although the IDS module is deployed
on individual devices, it does not monitor system status and
only monitors network traffic visible at the node. However,
as the watchdogs devices are heterogenous in location and
function, this may have an impact on the types of threats
encountered at a specific device. Therefore, each watch-
dog device is pre-configured with custom monitoring rules
which are designed to detect specific threats expected to
be encountered by a device with all the watchdog devices
reporting to a centralised Event Management System (EMS).
We believe that the distributed approach adopted by the
authors is symmetric with the inherent characteristics of a
typical IoT network however the role of EMS is limited to
information collection. This constrained role of EMS limits
the IDSs ability to monitor the overall state of a network and
therefore is unable to detect coordinated and sophisticated
attacks.
Le et al. [63] presented one of the early efforts to establish
an IDS for IoT where authors proposed a host-based IDS for
LoWPANs using Contiki OS and 6LowPAN [66], [67]. The
IDS is able to perform detection based on the information at
the node level and then transmit data to some centralized
system for further analysis. The detection system performs
detection using information collected from individual nodes
and does not consider the information from other nodes in
the network. The system does not show effective detection
under the distributed denial of service attack that not only
overwhelms the device but also congests the communica-
tion channel between nodes and the centralized system.
4.5 Hybrid approaches to intrusion detection
Midi et al. [15] proposed a self-adapting, knowledge-driven
expert Intrusion Detection System (KALIS) is introduced
which can change its performance after evaluating its effi-
ciency. It is focused on network features and its protocols to
improve detection efficiency. KALIS automatically collects
the information about the features and configure most suit-
able detection technique. All the KALIS components runs
independently and it supports a wide variety of mediums
and related protocols. The existing IDS for IoT deploy an in-
dependent IDS on each device comprising the IoT network
but the disadvantage is that each IDS is related to only one
device and does not have security details of other devices. In
KALIS the attack scenarios in IoT are considered and their
differences from other domains than IoT and relationship
is studied between different networks and device features
and attacks. Therefore, KALIS is concerned with the feature
details of a network and its components consequently de-
ciding upon most effective IDS for that scenario. The attacks
considered by KALIS are variants of DoS attacks i.e ICMP
Flood and SMURF which produce similar symptoms i.e.
high amount of ICMP Echo Reply Messages directed to
affect the machine.
Sedjelmaci et al. [62] a game theoretic technology is pro-
posed to activate anomaly detection technique to have a bal-
ance between detection and false positives and achieve en-
ergy consumption. The authors propose a novel lightweight
anomaly based intrusion detection technique for IoT taking
into account the resource constraints of the IoT devices. The
overall system in fact combines both signature and anomaly
based detection with the anomaly based engine only ac-
tivated when a previously unknown attack signature is
encountered. The authors adopt a game theoretic approach
based on Nash Equilibrium (NE) to determine the equilib-
rium state in which the IDS agent will activate its anomaly
detection technique to train, classify and build a rule related
to a new attacks signature. Furthermore, with respect to
placement of IDS, both the signature and anomaly based
detection systems are based on individual sensor devices.
The authors explain this decision to be motivated by the
objective to reduce the communication overhead based on
the assumption that the communication overhead is more
resource hungry as compared to computational overhead.
However, this is expected to have significant computational
overhead in the case of zero day attacks. Furthermore, the
proposed system is limited in its visibility to the events
occurring on the individual nodes and therefore limits its
ability to effectively detect of sophisticated attacks which
may be composed of multiple steps.
Raza et al. [17] proposed Svelte is proposed which is
a novel IDS for IoT. The main focus is on Routing at-
tacks like Spoofing, Sinkhole and Selective Forwarding. It
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is Lightweight and comply with the processing capabili-
ties of constrained nodes. The authors have designed their
system to be hybrid i.e. combining both signature and
anomaly based detection, and placing detection function
at both the sensors devices and the gateway router. Svelte
has three main modules i.e. 6LoWPAN Mapper (6 map-
per), Intrusion Detection component and Distributed Mini
Firewall.The centralized modules have two corresponding
lightweight modules in each constrained node. The first
module provides mapping information to the 6BR so it can
perform intrusion detection.The second module works with
the centralized firewall. Each constrained node also has a
third module to handle end-to-end packet loss. Although
Svelte presents a hybrid approach, attempting to adopt a
best of both approach however there are considerations
that should be taken into account. For instance, although
anomaly based intrusion detection systems have the advan-
tage of better detection accuracy for zero-day attacks, they
are typically resource hungry which can be a bottleneck
when implementing them on resource constrained sensor
devices. Furthermore, known attacks such as Rank attack,
Sinkhole and spoofing are well established leading to an
established signature for their detection. However, attacks
such as multi-stage or zero-day require analysis from a
wider perspective, analyzing behavioral and usage patterns
which makes a case for using anomaly based IDS. Therefore,
an IDS for IoT should take these factors into consideration
when making choices such as the type of IDS, placement
and the visibility of the data.
Sheikan et al. [65] presents a recent effort to address
intrusion detection with IoT systems particularly focusing
at the constrained resources available at the sensor devices.
The authors present a collaborative approach where IDS
modules are implemented at both device and edge-router
level to improve visibility, detection rate and to reduce
false positives. the authors propose signature based IDS
at the node level due to its performance efficiency and
anomaly based detection at the edge-router to enhance the
detection accuracy. The approach is novel in that it proposes
a innovative solution to achieve high detection accuracy
whilst taking into account the limited resources available
at the sensor devices.
4.6 Additional intrusion detection efforts within IoT
Daramas et al. [68] an enhanced and safe home based IDS
HIVE is proposed having 3 parts i.e. a sensor manager, fire-
base as cloud database and user authentication service, and
android application for monitoring, configuring and remote
notification. The proposed system is especially design for a
smart home with focus on detecting physical intrusion into
a home. HIVE aims to detect a physical intrusion by using
three sensors i.e. an infrared sensor to detect motions, a
magnetic switch sensor to detect status of a door or window
and a load cell sensor to detect pressure such as footsteps.
The resource constraints in general and the limited avail-
able of power in particular are one of the challenges for
any IDS within IoT. To this end, Gendreau [69] seek to
address this challenge by using an enhanced measurement
of situation awareness in the IoT. The authors highlight
the importance of awareness of state of monitoring system
and propose a framework to enhance the energy efficiency
of a self-reliant management and monitoring WSN cluster
head selection algorithm. Although the experimental results
demonstrate positive results for the approach however it is
limited to assessing the energy efficiency for a cluster head
selection algorithm and therefore require further efforts to
assess its impact on the monitoring capabilities of individual
nodes.
Mayzaud et al. [64] authors proposed a distributed sys-
tem architecture for detecting the version number attacks
in RPL-based networks and identifies malicious nodes. Fur-
thermore, a number of intrusion detection system architec-
tures have been developed in [70], [71] for the resource-
constrained 6LoWPAN devices based systems focusing on
the sinkhole and selective-forwarding attacks (well-known
attacks within 6LoWPAN networks).
Golomb et al. [72] present an innovative approach,
CIOTA, to intrusion detection for IoT leveraging blockchain
technology. The proposed approach is comprised of local
agents and a central component which coordinates infor-
mation (alerts) received from these agents. Authors use
blockchain technology to achieve assurances about the au-
thenticity of alerts generated by local agents.
5 PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF INTRUSION DETEC-
TION SYSTEMS
Intrusion detection systems are widely used to protect the
devices and end-users from the malicious actors. The per-
formance of these systems often depends on the type of
data and architectural setup they use while preventing the
attacker from misusing the private information of victims
for the frauds. The usage of data for the intrusion detection
introduces the challenges of security and privacy. Therefore,
we discuss the privacy implications of intrusion detection
systems in this section.
5.1 Type of data
Intrusion detection systems can be categorized on the basis
of network data they used for detecting the malicious actors.
Identification of correct data type not only affects the perfor-
mance of the system locally and globally, but also has an im-
pact on the privacy of the users. For instance, if the detection
system uses IP-address to analyze the behavior of device,
then it can easily traceback to the owner of this IP-address.
The challenge in this regard is two fold: 1) identifying the
data type that provides optimum performance in terms of
detection rate, and 2) ensure protection of the privacy of
network users. The existing intrusion detection systems use
two types of data for detecting the malicious actors i.e.
1) application layer data logs, and 2) network traces data.
The first type is data originated at the application level
and is normally associated with specific type of data set.
This type of data can provide information about the device
architecture and can help in fingerprinting the malicious
and non-malicious devices as normally malicious devices
do not follow the specific set of standards. The second data
type is the IP traces of the traffic and contains much more
details about the behavior of the devices. Another data type
that can be used is the content or payload of the information
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exchanged among devices such as a temperature reading, a
web-page, or meta data.
5.2 System architecture
An intrusion detection system for IoT can operate in two
modes i.e. 1) as the standalone system, or 2) as a collabora-
tive system. The stand-alone detection systems rely on the
traffic patterns observed locally within the network domain
or Internet service provider. These systems work indepen-
dently within a service provider network. The stand-alone
systems do not have any information about the behavior of
its users in other domains thus can easily be circumvented
by stealth techniques and smart attacker such as by simply
controlling the attack traffic to one domain but target large
number of domains simultaneously. An effective intrusion
detection system should consider the collective behaviour
of nodes generating traffic across different domains thus
building the collaborative network.
The collaborative solutions can be grouped in two types:
1) centralized - where alert information from the domain
collaborators is reported to the the centralized system which
classifies the behavior of traffic sender by analyzing traffic
patterns from multiple domains, or 2) The distributed or
decentralized settings - where alert information from each
service provider is shared and processed in a completely
distributed fashion without a centralized coordinator.
The major challenge towards the design of collaborative
intrusion detection system is regarding privacy protections
for the data used for detection. The domain provider or
Internet service provider are reluctant to share operational
data of their users with each other as it risks privacy of their
customers. A centralized trusted aggregation can overcome
the problem of privacy if the centralized repository assures
cooperating domain that their provided information would
not be misused and disclosed to any one. Furthermore,
use of cryptographic methods or addition of noise data
can be considered to anonymize user data, however this
is expected to substantially increase the network load and
computation time.
5.3 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the privacy implications of IoT
intrusion detection system for two important features, the
data type used for collaboration, and the system architec-
ture.
Firstly, the system architecture of the detection system
determines how data is transferred by the entities in the
detection systems. Standalone detection system which are
installed on the user device (e.g. IoT device) or installed at
the edge router (entry point router to smart home or the
company network) operate locally by recording data from
the single source, only use data from the single source,
therefore does not have high performance accuracy. The
collaborative system, however, operates in two modes the
centralized [47] [16] [56] architecture and the distributed
architecture [51] [52] [57]. In the centralized setup, the
centralized trusted setup is envisaged to protect the privacy
and integrity of the data provided to it. However, it may not
be ideal as the attacker has to compromise only one device
to breach the privacy of all collaborators. Furthermore, the
centralized system introduces the challenge of single point
failure, which may inhibit efficient collaboration in case of
failure.
The transfer of data to other parties or centralized system
has a risk of privacy. In this setting, the collaborating device
can operate in four settings: 1) transfer all the raw data to
the centralized system or other devices that then process all
the data for meaningful decision. This setting does not have
any privacy assurance as data is exposed at other entity
whilst also increasing computational workload, 2) transfer
processed data for instance exchanging traffic statistics of
host or IP-address , however it still carries privacy threat
but without requiring significant additional resources, and
3) the encrypted exchange of data. This setting assures
privacy-preservation but requires extensive computation
and communication overhead for the exchange of encrypted
data.
Overall, privacy is an important feature which should
be afforded by intrusion detection system especially within
a collaborative system. However, our analysis of the exist-
ing literature reveals that the research community has not
given much attention to privacy preserving collaboration
among the IoT domains or IoT devices. This may be due
to resource-constrained nature of IoT devices which limits
alert information and cryptographic processing of data due
to computational overheads.
6 ANALYSIS OF CURRENT IDS APPROACHES
In order to conduct a rigorous and methodical analysis
of contemporary literature presented in the section 4, we
have applied a thorough criteria with metrics which are
significant for effective intrusion detection for IoT. The indi-
vidual element of the criteria along with a brief explanation
are presented below. The comparative analysis of existing
approaches for these criteria is presented in Table 1.
• Placement: As with the contemporary computing
systems, the placement of an intrusion detection
system is crucial as it determines the level of visibility
it can offer to the activities within the monitored sys-
tem. For instance, a network based IDS is limited to
monitoring the network traffic originated or destined
for the monitored host and therefore cannot monitor
any process subversion or privilege escalation within
the monitored host.
• Detection Time frame: One of the important char-
acteristic of IoT systems is the dynamic nature of
the system with the participating nodes following an
adhoc pattern. Therefore the time-frame of detection
becomes even more important with the objective to
detect an attack as soon as possible to avoid spread-
ing infection to wider devices.
• Detection Engine: An IDS can utilize a variety of
detection engine such as anomaly, signature and
game based etc. The choice of detection engine has
two-fold impact i.e. i) it can affect the ability of an
IDS to detect attacks and ii) it impacts the perfor-
mance overhead incurred by the engine. For instance,
although signature based IDS have been identified to
be resource efficient, they do not have the ability to
detect zero-day attacks.
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• Architecture: The system architecture of the intru-
sion detection system specifies how the detection
system carried out its detection functions. The sys-
tem architecture not only affects the detection accu-
racy and performance but also affects user privacy.
The standalone detection system mainly operates at
the local machine or the device thereby suscepti-
ble to extended detection time because of the non-
availability of enough data and stealthy nature of
the attacker. A collaborative architecture utilizes data
from different sources e.g. IoT devices or network
devices within the same or different organization.
It can improve the detection accuracy however it
introduces the challenge of privacy of the data shared
between the entities. Furthermore, with regards to
detection accuracy and performance, a typical IoT
system is comprised of a number of sensor devices
arranged into a local network such as a LoWPAN
and an edge router which manages communica-
tion between local network and the Internet. Within
this context, existing approaches can be categorized
based on the location of the IDS module with dis-
tributed referring to IDS module implemented on
local sensor nodes and centralized referring to IDS
module implemented at the edge router.
• Performance Overhead: A typical IoT device is con-
strained with respect to resources available for com-
pute processes such as intrusion detection. Therefore,
we believe performance overhead caused by an IDS
is one of the important criterion and can be measured
in the form of energy consumption or CPU usage by
the IDS.
• Attack types: We have presented a comprehensive
discussion about the potential attacks within an IoT
system supported by an attack model. These differ-
ent types of attacks can be detected at different levels
(network or host) and using different approaches
such as anomaly, signature based etc.
• Detection Performance: Detection performance rep-
resents the rate of with which an IDS can successfully
detect a malicious attempt. It is one of the fundamen-
tal attributes of an IDS as it can be directly aligned to
its effectiveness.
• Scalability: Typically, the number of devices within
an IoT system is significantly higher compared with
contemporary systems. In order to address the sig-
nificant number of devices involved, the scalability
of the IDS is an important criteria.
7 OPEN CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this section, we highlight some future research directions
which require further investigation and efforts to improve
overall security of an IoT system.
1) Constrained resources: A typical IoT device has
limited resources such as small processing power,
low storage capacity, and limited battery power.
Within this context, non-resource efficient intrusion
detection system would drain the resources of the
IoT system and its devices. Therefore, it is important
to have a Intrusion detection system that fulfills
two important characteristics: 1) any IDS should not
incur significant computational and communication
overhead, and 2) IDS should achieve high detection
accuracy. In particular, the use of anomaly based
detection systems [53] [52] [51] requires more re-
sources than the signature based detection systems
while having a tradeoff between detection accuracy
and overheads. For instance, anomaly detection is
particularly effective against previously unknown
attacks, but is expected to incur significant perfor-
mance overhead. As an attempt to explore oppor-
tunities within this context, we have formulated
a collaborative intrusion detection system in [65]
which aims to use both anomaly and signature
based detection engines to achieve performance ef-
ficiency without compromising detection accuracy.
Our analysis has revealed that many of the exist-
ing systems have not been designed for resource-
constrained devices, however these approaches
mainly focused on increasing the detection accuracy
with small false positive. We believe there should be
trade-off among three important factors 1) high de-
tection accuracy, 2) small overheads, and 3) privacy-
preservation. Furthermore, dedicated efforts are re-
quired to devise approaches considering resource
constraints that primarily focus on the energy con-
sumption agnostic of resources and memory con-
sumption.
2) Multi-stage attacks: A typical attacker normally
carries an attack in multiple stages. Such sophisti-
cated attacks are termed as Multi-stage attacks, and
are common attack mechanisms for traditional and
emerging computing systems such as IoT. Existing
detection systems for IoT solely focus on the de-
tection of individual threats agnostic of potential
relationships between them. We believe the dy-
namic nature of the IoT systems makes the challenge
of multi-stage attack detection non-trivial requir-
ing explicit efforts to address it. Jun and Chi [20]
represent one of the initial effort which recognize
and explicitly seek to detect relationships between
different malicious incidents. However, it represents
a limited effort and further work is required to
address detection and protection against multi-stage
attacks within the IoT systems.
3) Device protection: As identified by [73], one of core
issues with respect to the security of IoT systems is
the security of the device as ”it is often neglected by the
manufacturers and usually an afterthought”. The lack of
protection at device level within such systems has
resulted in significant security attacks such as Mirai
botnet in 2016 [6] and its more recent versions such
as Brickerbot [7] and Reaper [8]. In order to protect
against such threats device-level security measures
are paramount which can protect IoT systems. One
such measure can be an effective intrusion detec-
tion installed within the IoT device. Through our
research we have identified efforts such as [46] and
[65] which propose to develop intrusion detection
capability within the device however these efforts
are generally limited in that these require further re-
13
finement to take into account unique characteristics
of IoT devices such as those explained earlier in this
section.
4) Large-scale attacks: With the widespread adoption
of IoT systems, the number of IoT devices are in-
creasing exponentially with some estimates predict-
ing more than 50 billion IoT devices by the year
2020. The impact of this growth on securing the
IoT system is is two-folds; firstly, the enormous
scale makes IoT systems a lucrative target for the
malicious actors, and secondly, it also presents IoT
systems as a resource which can be used to launch
a large-scale attacks. An example of such attacks is
the botnets i.e. Mirai botnet and Brickerbot launched
a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) which com-
promised the Domain Name System (DNS) service
[6]. Moreover, due to the nature of the IoT systems,
routing attacks are typically contagious i.e. affecting
all the devices within a LoWPAN. These attacks de-
mand a holistic approach to the intrusion detection
which is able to monitor and detect the state of the
overall network as well as the individual devices.
5) Limited experimentation and evaluation: In or-
der to assess the effectiveness of intrusion detec-
tion efforts, rigorous experimentation is required
for integrating multiple dimensions of the evalua-
tion. Although, experiments have been conducted
to demonstrate the effectiveness with respect to
detection accuracy and false positive rate, but this
evaluation is performed without using appropriate
simulation software or hardware to replicate a real-
life IoT setting. For instance, a number of efforts
have used KDD 99 dataset [74] within an isolated
environment to conduct experimentation, however
it has limitations: 1) the KDD 99 dataset does not
accurately reflect the current threat types prevalent
for the IoT systems and, 2) conducting evaluation
in an isolated environment prohibits taking into ac-
count important factors such as resource constraints
of a typical IoT device. These issues require explicit
efforts to improve state of the art with respect to
the evaluation of intrusion detection schemes within
IoT systems.Further, we believe that research into
dedicated honeypots for IoT systems is required and
will be significant in facilitating thorough evalua-
tion of future intrusion detection approaches.
6) Unavailability of accurate data: Through our re-
search, we have identified unavailability of real data
from an IoT system as one of the bottlenecks to
achieve rigorous evaluation. In absence of such data,
a number of current approaches have used KDD99
datasets which contains network traffic data for con-
temporary computing systems. We believe further
research into dedicated honeypots for IoT systems
is required and will be significant in facilitating
thorough evaluation of future intrusion detection
approaches.
8 CONCLUSIONS
The emergence of IoT has been led by the extraordinary evo-
lution of the sensor devices and communication technolo-
gies such as Zigbee, WSN and 6LoWPAN. Consequently the
volume and variety of security threats for such systems have
increased manifold highlighting the importance of an effi-
cient intrusion detection system. This paper has presented a
comprehensive review of existing efforts within this domain
aiming to identify open challenges and future directions.
The paper has provided new focus on the performance
overhead, energy consumption and privacy implications
incurred by existing approaches. Highlighting challenges
surrounding these aspects, this review has attempted to
enthuse researchers to address key challenges identified in
this article to achieve effective intrusion detection for IoT
systems.
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